Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
We study the problem of locating a single public good along a segment when agents have single-dipped preferences. We ask whether there are unanimous and strategy-proof rules for this model. The answer is positive and we characterize all such rules. We generalize our model to allow the set of alternatives to be unbounded. If the set of alternatives does not have a maximal and a minimal element, there is no meaningful notion of efficiency. However, we show that the range of every strategy-proof rule has a maximal and a minimal element. We then characterize all strategy-proof rules.
KeywordsSingle-dipped preferences Strategy-proofness Group strategy-proofness
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