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Peters, H., Sudhölter, P. Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography. Int J Game Theory 41, 915–930 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0358-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0358-2