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Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games

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Abstract

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is studied. A player perfectly observes any other player’s action choice with a fixed and finite delay. The observational delays between different pairs of players are heterogeneous and asymmetric. The Folk theorem extends to this setup. As is shown for an example, for a range of discount factors, the set of perfect public equilibria is reduced under certain conditions and efficiency improves when the players take into account private information. This model applies to many situations in which there is a heterogeneous delay between information generation and the players’ reaction.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departamento de Economía, Edificio de Amigos, Universidad de Navarra, 31009, Pamplona, Spain

    Markus Kinateder

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  1. Markus Kinateder
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Correspondence to Markus Kinateder.

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Kinateder, M. Delayed perfect monitoring in repeated games. Int J Game Theory 42, 283–294 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0349-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0349-3

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