International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp 483–502 | Cite as

Uncoupled automata and pure Nash equilibria

Original Paper

Abstract

We study the problem of reaching a pure Nash equilibrium in multi-person games that are repeatedly played, under the assumption of uncoupledness: EVERY player knows only his own payoff function. We consider strategies that can be implemented by finite-state automata, and characterize the minimal number of states needed in order to guarantee that a pure Nash equilibrium is reached in every game where such an equilibrium exists.

Keywords

Automaton Nash equilibrium Uncoupledness 

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References

  1. Hart S, Mas-Colell A (2003) Uncoupled dynamics do not lead to nash equilibrium. Am Econ Rev 93: 1830–1836CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Hart S, Mas-Colell A (2006) Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and nash equilibrium. Games Econ Behav 57: 286–303CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Study of Rationality and The Institute of MathematicsThe Hebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael

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