Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo

Abstract

I analyze a stochastic bargaining game in which a renewable surplus is divided among n ≥ 5 committee members in each of an infinite number of periods, and the division implemented in one period becomes the status quo allocation of the surplus in the ensuing period. I establish existence of equilibrium exhibiting minimum winning coalitions, assuming sufficiently mild concavity of stage preferences. The analysis highlights the role of proposal power in committee deliberations and yields a fully strategic version of McKelvey’s (J Econ Theory 12:472–482, 1976; Econometrica 47:1086–1112, 1979) dictatorial agenda setting.

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Correspondence to Tasos Kalandrakis.

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Kalandrakis, T. Minimum winning coalitions and endogenous status quo. Int J Game Theory 39, 617–643 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0202-5

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Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • Dictatorial agenda setting
  • Endogenous status quo
  • Proposal power

JEL Classification

  • C73
  • C78
  • D72