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International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 37, Issue 4, pp 505–523 | Cite as

Stable profit sharing in a patent licensing game: general bargaining outcomes

  • Naoki WatanabeEmail author
  • Shigeo Muto
Original Paper

Abstract

By considering coalition structures formed by an external licensor of a patented technology and oligopolistic firms, we investigate licensing agreements that can be reached as bargaining outcomes under those coalition structures. The following results hold in a generalized patent licensing game. The core for a coalition structure is always empty, unless the grand coalition forms. We give a necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core (for the grand coalition). If the number of licensees that maximizes licensees’ total surplus is greater than the number of existing non-licensees, each symmetric bargaining set for a coalition structure is a singleton, and the optimal number of licensees that maximizes the licensor’s revenue is uniquely determined.

Keywords

Licensing Coalition structure Bargaining set Core 

JEL Classification

C71 D45 D43 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2008

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Social Systems and Management, Graduate School of Systems and Information EngineeringUniversity of TsukubaTsukuba, IbarakiJapan
  2. 2.Department of Social Engineering, Graduate School of Decision Science and TechnologyTokyo Institute of TechnologyMeguro, TokyoJapan

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