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On eligibility by the de Borda voting rules

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Abstract

A criterion for eligibility of a candidate by the set of scoring rules (de Borda voting rules) is given. This criterion generalizes a necessary (but not sufficient) condition of eligibility in Moulin (Axioms of cooperative decision making, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988).

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References

  • Moulin H (1988) Axioms of cooperative decision making. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

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  • Rockafellar RT (1970) Convex analysis. Princeton University Press, Princeton

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Higher Mathematics, Ivanovo State Power University, Rabfakovskaya str. 34, Ivanovo, 153003, Russia

    V. Yu. Kiselev

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  1. V. Yu. Kiselev
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Correspondence to V. Yu. Kiselev.

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The author thanks Profs. H. Moulin and A. V. Shapovalov for illuminating discussions.

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Kiselev, V.Y. On eligibility by the de Borda voting rules. Int J Game Theory 37, 303–305 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0096-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0096-z

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