Abstract
We present a new allocation rule for the class of games with a nonempty core: the core-center. This allocation rule selects a centrally located point within the core of any such game. We provide a deep discussion of its main properties.
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González-Díaz, J., Sánchez-Rodríguez, E. A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center. Int J Game Theory 36, 27–46 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0074-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0074-5