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Bank stability and economic growth: trade-offs or opportunities?

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Abstract

Recent debates on banking regulation indicate that regulatory capital improves banking stability but may also impede economic growth. These outcomes suggest that regulatory capital reform may induce a trade-off between bank stability and economic growth. We enter this conversation by investigating the direct relationship between bank stability and economic growth and, further, examine the effect that regulatory capital and institutional quality have on this relationship. Using generalized method of moments on a global panel data set of over 100 countries, across the period 1995–2015, we find no support for a regulatory capital-induced trade-off between banking stability and economic growth. On the contrary, we observe a positive relationship. Moreover, using an innovative approach based on a trade-off metric, we find strong support for the role of regulatory capital in simultaneously maintaining high levels of economic output and banking stability. Institutional quality, however, does not provide evidence of such an effect directly, but enhances the positive effects of regulatory capital. These results provide strong support for the current implementation of increased regulatory capital.

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Notes

  1. Table 5 in ‘Appendix’ provides the description of the variables used in this study.

  2. We tested the collinearity between \(Z{\text{-score}}\) and \({\text{car}}\) which is very low.

  3. The detail results are available upon request. For individual indicators category, political stability (ps) and government effectiveness (ge), in Table 6, are negative and statistically significant, while the interaction terms are positive and significant. Such an outcome reflects that the overall effect of these institutional variables is dependent on the level of \(Z{\text{-score}}\). These results suggest that if bank stability is too low, institutional quality can have negative effects on growth, but when bank stability is sufficiently high, institutional quality positively impacts growth. This again points to the need for adequate interaction measures.

  4. We perform several robustness checks by varying the control sets in the model. We also tested the individual institutional quality as well as a composite index of institutional quality on the trade-off metric.

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Correspondence to Murshed Chowdhury.

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Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

Table 5 List of independent variables used
Table 6 Determinants of GDP growth (Eq. 1) with individual WGI indicators
Table 7 Determinants of trade-off metric (Eq. 7), with individual WGI indicators
Table 8 Determinants of GDP growth (without banking crisis dummy)
Table 9 Determinants of real GDP growth (no averaging of data)

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Stewart, R., Chowdhury, M. & Arjoon, V. Bank stability and economic growth: trade-offs or opportunities?. Empir Econ 61, 827–853 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-020-01886-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-020-01886-4

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