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Legal tradition and antitrust effectiveness

Empirical Economics volume 43, pages 1263–1297 (2012)Cite this article

Abstract

This article uses cross-country data to empirically investigate through which channel legal origin can influence antitrust effectiveness. The evidence shows that the adaptability channel (legal flexibility) is more important for explaining antitrust effectiveness than the political channel (authority independence). The evidence also suggests that countries in which a judicial decision is a source of law will provide more legal flexibility and will adapt more easily to changing economic circumstances. They will therefore also have better enforcement of antitrust rules. On the other hand, a legal tradition that takes no formal notice of legal precedent will make the competition environment much less predictable. To the extent that these findings are true, one would expect competition agencies in Common law countries to perform better than those in Civil law countries.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Jinhe Center for Economic Research, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, China

    Tay-Cheng Ma

  2. Department of Economics, Chinese Culture University, Taipei, Taiwan

    Tay-Cheng Ma

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  1. Tay-Cheng Ma
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Correspondence to Tay-Cheng Ma.

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Ma, TC. Legal tradition and antitrust effectiveness. Empir Econ 43, 1263–1297 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-011-0517-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-011-0517-5

Keywords

  • Antitrust effectiveness
  • Legal origin
  • Legal flexibility

JEL Classification

  • L400