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Bank–firms topology in Italy

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Abstract

An empirical analysis of the Italian system of banks and firms is carried out using the network theory. The emerging architecture of this economic network shows peculiar behaviors: (i) Multiple lending is very widespread; (ii) Small firms are preferentially financed by small banks; (iii) Large firms are financed by many banks; (iv) the ratio between loans and deposits is much higher for large banks than for small banks, while (v) strong size heterogeneity appears among co-financing banks, and (vi) the spanning-tree is very hierarchical.

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Correspondence to G. De Masi.

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De Masi, G., Gallegati, M. Bank–firms topology in Italy. Empir Econ 43, 851–866 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-011-0512-x

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