Abstract
Rent-to-own (RTO) is attractive to financially distressed consumers. It allows immediate access to merchandise and an opportunity for eventually acquisition. Yet goods can be returned at any point without penalty or other adverse consequences. We use a competing risk methodology that accounts for unobserved consumer heterogeneity to study how contracts conclude, estimating the probabilities of exit—via return, purchase, or skip—and the associated durations. The estimated outcome probabilities highlight the use of the embedded return option by RTO consumers and the trade-offs and cross-subsidization implicit in the RTO contractual arrangement. We offer rational and behavioral explanations of consumer behavior in the RTO market, which we believe can be generalized to other consumer loan markets.
This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
References
Anderson MH, Jackson R (2001) A reconsideration of rent-to-own. J Consum Aff 35: 295–307
Anderson MH, Jaggia S (2009) Rent-to-own agreements: customer characteristics and contract outcomes. J Econ Bus 61(1): 51–69
Association of Progressive Rental Organizations (APRO) (2001) Industry revenue exceeds $5 billion. View (APRO Newsletter), September 4
Blank R (1989) Analyzing the length of welfare spells. J Public Econ 39: 245–273
Deng Y, Quigley JM, Order RV (2000) Mortgage terminations, heterogeneity and the exercise of mortgage options. Econometrica 68(2): 273–307
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (2005) Guidelines for payday lending. http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/payday/
Federal Trade Commission (2000) Survey of rent-to-own customers. Bureau of Economics Staff Report, Washington, DC
Frederick S, Loewenstein G, O’Donoghue T (2002) Time discounting and time preference: a critical review. J Econ Lit 40: 351–401
Freedman A (1993) Peddling dreams: a marketing giant uses its sales prowess to profit on poverty. Wall Str J A 1: A10
Han A, Hausman J (1990) Flexible parametric estimation of duration and competing risks models. J Appl Econ 5: 1–28
Hill R, Ramp D, Silver L (1998) The rent-to-own industry and pricing disclosure tactics. J Public Policy Mark 17: 3–10
Katz L, Meyer B (1990) Unemployment duration, recall expectations, and unemployment outcomes. Q J Econ 105: 973–1002
Lacko J, McKernan S, Hastak M (2002) Customer experience with rent-to-own transactions. J Public Policy Mark 21: 126–138
Lancaster T (1990) The econometric analysis of transition data. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
McCall BP (1996) Unemployment insurance rules, joblessness, and part-time work. Econometrica 64: 647–682
McKernan S, Lacko J, Hastak M (2003) Empirical evidence on the determinants of rent-to-own use and purchase behavior. Econ Dev Q 17: 33–52
Meyer BD (1990) Unemployment insurance and unemployment spells. Econometrica 58: 757–782
Prelec D, Loewenstein G (1998) The red and the black: mental accounting of savings and debt. Mark Sci 17: 4–24
Stegman MA, Faris R (2003) Payday lending: a business model that encourages chronic borrowing. Econ Dev Q 17(1): 8–32
Swagler R, Wheeler P (1989) Rental-purchase agreements: a preliminary investigation of consumer attitudes and behaviors. J Consum Aff 23: 145–160
Thaler R (1985) Mental accounting and consumer choice. Market Sci 4: 199–214
Thomas J (1996) On the interpretation of the covariate estimates in the independent competing-risks models. Bull Econ Res 48: 27–39
Walden M (1990) The economics of rent-to-own contracts. J Consum Aff 24: 326–337
Zikmund-Fisher B, Parker A (1999) Demand for rent-to-own contracts: a behavioral economic explanation. J Econ Behav Organ 38: 199–216
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Anderson, M.H., Jaggia, S. Return, purchase, or skip? Outcome, duration, and consumer behavior in the rent-to-own market. Empir Econ 43, 313–334 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-011-0461-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-011-0461-4
Keywords
- Competing risks
- Unobserved heterogeneity
- Transaction data
- Consumer credit
- Payment schedule
- Sub-prime lending
JEL Classification
- C24
- D14
- G29