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Bounding revenue leakages at scale-bid timber auctions: evidence from Wisconsin state forest auctions

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Abstract

Bid skewing is a potential issue when timber is sold at scale-bid auctions and the seller’s timber-cruise estimate is used for bid evaluation. I illustrate the problem and its potential effect on seller stumpage revenue, and then quantify the impact of species-specific reserve prices as well as species-specific bid caps using data gathered from 41 Wisconsin State forestry auctions.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin Oshkosh, 800 Algoma Blvd., Oshkosh, WI, 54901, USA

    M. Ryan Haley

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  1. M. Ryan Haley
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Correspondence to M. Ryan Haley.

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Haley, M.R. Bounding revenue leakages at scale-bid timber auctions: evidence from Wisconsin state forest auctions. Empir Econ 39, 427–437 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-009-0311-9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-009-0311-9

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