Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical framework to analyze traffic congestion from a micro-behavioral foundation perspective. It extends the evolution of an n-person prisoner’s dilemma within actual geographical space, integrating an agent-based model with GIS, in conflicting spatial interactions that ultimately lead to the decline of cooperation. The spatial agent-based model captures the response strategies of autonomous individuals in a landscape that contextualizes both the natural and the built environment. The result suggests that the loss of context preservation could lead to the extinction of cooperation, the opposite of the earlier findings. This theoretical framework thus serves as a basis for the analysis of collective strategic decisions about the use of a common resource from a game theoretical perspective.
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Anantsuksomsri, S., Tontisirin, N. A spatial agent-based model of a congestion game: evolutionary game theory in space. Ann Reg Sci 57, 371–391 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-016-0770-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-016-0770-9