Abstract
We propose a scheme for secure voting that involves the candidates themselves in implementing the voting system. It exploits the competing interests (rivalry) and mutual distrust among the candidates to force an honest election.
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Peter Höfner, Robert van Glabbeek and Ian Hayes
This work is partially supported by National Science Foundation grant CCF-0811536.
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Misra, J. A secure voting scheme based on rational self-interest. Form Asp Comp 24, 793–805 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-012-0248-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-012-0248-1