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Personal income taxation under mobility, exogenous and endogenous welfare weights, and asymmetric information

Abstract.

This paper analyses how governments should tax labour income accruing to a group of highly skilled and geographically mobile individuals who divide their time or career between several jurisdictions. The analysis differs from previous models on migration and taxation by addressing optimal regulation when agents work for several principals. Optimal taxation is developed for social welfare functions with exogenous and endogenous welfare weights. Marginal income taxes are applied for screening purposes, and the rates are lower with endogenous than with exogenous welfare weights.

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Received: 22 January 1998/Accepted: 3 July 1999)

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Osmundsen, P., Schjelderup, G. & Hagen, K. Personal income taxation under mobility, exogenous and endogenous welfare weights, and asymmetric information. J Popul Econ 13, 623–637 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480050154

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480050154

  • JEL classification: D82, L51, H21
  • Key words: Mechanism design, asymmetric information, optimal income taxation