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Are migrant minorities strategically self-selected?


In this paper we focus on the possibility of migrants' self-selection through strategic remittances. We argue that migrants of a specific community might be pooled with migrants from other ethnic minorities on the labor market of the foreign host country and that this could reduce the occurrence of strategic remittances. In a simple model with two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, facing two possible actions, to migrate or not to migrate, we derive the theoretical conditions under which strategic transfers are still operating when pooling among communities is introduced. We then show through numerical illustrations that the case for strategic transfers is rather weak when using realistic values for the main parameters of the model.

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Received: 1 October 1997/Accepted: 7 April 1998

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Docquier, F., Rapoport, H. Are migrant minorities strategically self-selected?. J Popul Econ 11, 579–588 (1998).

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  • Key words: Migrations
  • worker's remittances
  • strategic self-selection
  • JEL classification: D82
  • F22
  • J15
  • J61