Skip to main content

On private incentives to acquire household production skills

Abstract.

In non-cooperative family models, being good at contributing to family public goods like household production may reduce one's utility, since it tends to crowd out contributions from one's spouse. Similar effects also arise in cooperative models with non-cooperative threat point: improved contribution productivity entails loss of bargaining power. This strategic effect must be traded against the benefits of household production skills, in terms of increased consumption possibilities. Since cooperation involves extensive specialization, incentives to acquire household production skills are strikingly asymmetric, with the one not specializing in household production having strong disincentives for household skill acquisition.

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Received: 06 July 1999/Accepted: 08 June 2000

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Vagstad, S. On private incentives to acquire household production skills. J Popul Econ 14, 301–312 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480000054

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480000054

  • JEL classification: D13
  • H41
  • J16
  • J22
  • J24
  • Key words: Family bargaining
  • household productivity
  • gender roles