Journal of Population Economics

, Volume 27, Issue 4, pp 1087–1106 | Cite as

Endogenous age discrimination

  • Christian MangerEmail author
Original Paper


This paper shows that hiring discrimination against old workers occurs in imperfect labour markets even if individual productivity does not decrease with age and in the absence of a taste for discrimination. Search and informational frictions generate unemployment, with less productive workers facing higher risks of unemployment. Therefore, the employment status provides a signal for expected productivity. This stigma of unemployment becomes stronger with individual age and reduces the hiring opportunities of older workers. Political measures such as a reduction in dismissal protection can help to restore efficiency.


Search frictions Age discrimination Unemployment 

JEL Classification

J14 J41 J71 



I am grateful to Leo Kaas, Carlos Alós–Ferrer, Friedrich Breyer, Stefan Zink and two anonymous referees for the numerous helpful comments and remarks.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of MannheimMannheimGermany

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