Abstract
Household models estimated on labour supplies alone generally assume nonmarket time to be pure leisure. Previous work on collective household decisionmaking is extended here by taking domestic work into account in the Chiappori et al. (J Polit Econ 110(1):37–72, 2002) model. Derivatives of the household “sharing rule” can then be estimated in a similar way. Using the 1998 French TimeUse Survey, we compare estimates of labour supply functions assuming first that nonmarket time is pure leisure and then taking household production into account. The results are similar but more robust when household production is included. Collective rationality is rejected when domestic work is omitted.
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Notes
As shown in Apps and Rees (1996).
The INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques) is the French Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies. We are grateful to the French Research Center LASMAS for making the data available to us.
See also Samuelson (1956).
As in the farm production model of the development literature.
This could be questionable for activities which have a strong component of leisure or “own” consumption, such as time spent playing with children or cooking for friends. In these cases, there is joint production (see Pollak and Wachter 1975). However, activities of this kind represent only a small proportion of total household “tasks”.
See, for example, Lacroix et al. (1998).
In France, an exception is the 1989 Modes de Vie survey, but it suffers from important drawbacks for our purpose (see Lecocq 2001).
As in Gronau (1977).
It can be argued that both market and domestic goods may have a public component. A few papers deal with public goods besides private consumption (see, for example, Chiappori et al. 2005 or Donni 2006), but they do not include domestic production. Couprie (2007) assumes that market goods are privately consumed, and only domestic goods are assumed to be public goods.
Here, the weights are a function of prices, among other variables.
From the proof in Appendix 1
An exception is Bourguignon and Chiuri (2005).
We also tried using annual working hours, as in Chiappori et al. (2002). The results, which are not reported here, are very similar to those from model 1.
Nonlabour income is known only at the household level (not at the individual level). Also, for some households, only labour income brackets are known. For these households, labour income was estimated using a larger survey from the INSEE (“Enquête sur l’emploi 1999”, i.e. Labour Force Survey 1999). All the information about the estimations is available from the authors.
See last line of Table 2.
France is divided into 100 areas called departments.
See Appendix 1.
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Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Andrew Clark (ParisSciences Economiques), Olivier Donni (Université de Cergy) and Guy Lacroix (Université Laval) for helpful comments. We are also grateful to Alessandro Cigno, the editor, as well as to the two anonymous referees for their very valuable comments and suggestions.
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Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that ψ = ψ _{ f }. We also have: \(\psi _m =\mathit\Pi +y\psi \)
By differentiation of the labour supply equations
we obtain:
Note that, with reference to the results in Chiappori et al. (2002), only Eqs. 19 and 20 include a new specific term: \(\frac{\partial \mathit\Pi }{\partial \it{w}_f }\)
Taking the same notation, we define \(A=\frac{h_{\it{w}_m }^f }{h_y^f }\), \(B=\frac{h_{\it{w}_f }^m }{h_y^m }\), \(C_l =\frac{h_{s_l }^f }{h_y^f }\), \(D_l =\frac{h_{s_l }^m }{h_y^m }\). We assume only one distribution factor and suppress the subscripts l and q to simplify the notation. The partial derivatives of the sharing rule with respect to wages, nonlabour income and the distribution factor are given by:
\(\frac{\partial \psi }{\partial y}=\frac{D}{DC}; \quad \frac{\partial \psi }{\partial s}=\frac{CD}{DC}; \quad \frac{\partial \psi }{\partial \it{w}_m }=\frac{AD}{DC}.\) Only \(\frac{\partial \psi }{\partial \it{w}_f }\) is modified. From Hotelling’s lemma, we obtain: \(\frac{\partial \mathit\Pi }{\partial \it{w}_f }=t_f \), and then \(\frac{\partial \psi }{\partial \it{w}_f }\) is given by:
\(\frac{\partial \psi }{\partial \it{w}_f }=\frac{BC}{DC}t_f .\) Note that t_{ f } is fully observed in the data.
The same result holds with several distribution factors. This is a straightforward result from Chiappori et al. (2002). Note also that when there is more than one distribution factor, testable restrictions similar to those presented in Chiappori et al. (2002) can be derived from the model.
Finally, with no domestic production, the model simplifies to \(\mathit\Pi \) = 0, and thus \(\frac{\partial \mathit\Pi }{\partial \it{w}_f }=0\), and ψ is now simply nonlabour income. In this case, Eq. 20 reduces to:
and (4^{′}) to:
Then, \(\frac{\partial \psi }{\partial \it{w}_f }\) reduces to:
And thus the formulas in Chiappori et al. (2002) are found as a special case of the more general model developed here.
Appendix 2: Description of domestic tasks
Domestic activities include all activities around:

food and drink: preparation (cutting, cooking, making jam), presentation (laying the table), kitchen and food cleanup (washing up)

housework: interior cleaning, clothes activities (laundry, mending, sewing, knitting, repairing and maintaining textiles), storing interior household items and tidying

interior maintenance and repair of house and vehicles: repairing, water and heating upkeep

household management: financial (bills, count,...)

shopping

childcare: physical and medical care, reading, talking with and listening to children, homework help, picking up/dropping off children, playing and leisure with children

care for household adults

care for animals and pets

lawn, garden and houseplants
Appendix 3: Computation of the male’s share
In Table 4, the derivatives of the sharing rule have been computed directly calculating the derivatives of \(\mathit\Pi +y\psi \) using formulas symmetrical to those which appear in Section 3.3.
The formulas in Appendix Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 11 show that the derivatives of the sharing rules are not symmetrical for the man and the woman, because of the term t _{ f } in the derivative with respect to \(\it{w}_{f}\). It thus must be checked whether the results are the same when computing directly the derivatives of the male’s share. In this latter case, ψ represents now the man’s share and \(\mathit\Pi +y\psi \) the woman’s share.
As the reduced forms of labour supply are identical, we expect the derivatives with respect to the male and female wages to have an opposite sign and to be about the same absolute value in Table 3. The same should hold for the derivative with respect to the sexratio (the coefficient is in fact the exact opposite, see Table 3). The derivative with respect to nonlabour income is the complement to 1 of the coefficient computed in Table 3; indeed, we exchange ψ and \(\mathit\Pi +y\psi \), so that we exchange and as \(\mathit\Pi \) does not depend on y.
Table 4 presents the results. When comparing with the results of model 2b in Table 3, it can be seen that the derivatives relative to wages show, as expected, an opposite sign and a similar value: an increase in either the male or the female wage should have an exact opposite effect on the male and the female income share. The same expected result is observed for the sex ratio, where the parameters obtained in the two models are exactly opposite and both significant. As expected also the coefficient found for non labour income is the complement to 1 for the coefficient found in the case of the female’s share: when non labour income increases, say by one euro, then it was found (Table 3) that the female share increased by about 62 cents. Here, it is found that the male share does increase in that case by 1–62 cents = 38 cents. For this coefficient, χ ^{2} tests show that on one hand, we cannot reject the nullhypothesis, but on the other hand, the hypothesis that it equals to 1 can be rejected (these are the exact symmetries of the results found in Table 3).
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Rapoport, B., Sofer, C. & Solaz, A. Household production in a collective model: some new results. J Popul Econ 24, 23–45 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480100308x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001480100308x
Keywords
 Collective model
 Household production
 Labour supply
JEL Classification
 D13
 J22