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Social security and conflict within the family

Abstract

A husband and wife, though benefitting from marriage, may yet misappropriate some of the spouse's assets rather than let all be saved. In a Nash equilibrium, family savings may therefore be lower than what each spouse would prefer. Social Security, which is a form of forced, secure saving, can therefore increase welfare.

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Correspondence to Amihai Glazer.

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Responsible editor: Alessandro Cigno

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Glazer, A. Social security and conflict within the family. J Popul Econ 21, 331–338 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-006-0118-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00148-006-0118-3

Keywords

  • Social security
  • Savings
  • Bargaining

JEL Classification

  • H55
  • D13
  • D91