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Beyond the frame problem: what (else) can Heidegger do for AI?

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Abstract

About three decades ago, AI theory underwent a sharp turn as a consequence of criticism that pointed out the problem of externalism in the cognitivist position. Hubert Dreyfus, undoubtedly the main exponent of this criticism, opened the possibility of a Heideggerian reading using the frame problem to bring to light obscurities that otherwise would have been very difficult to detect. However, the question still remains of whether or not Heidegger’s philosophy can serve as the source of a positive contribution to AI. In this paper, we argue that in the small measure in which such a task has been attempted, its orientation has been hampered by the omission of what, for Heidegger, was the central issue to be pondered: the question for being and the ontological difference. To propose a possible direction in which AI can be headed as a consequence of this novel perspective, we undertake a brief and schematic review of two published projects suggesting that they both manage to avoid the frame problem and also bear this Heideggerian outlook.

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Acknowledgements

A huge thank you to Dr. María Clemencia (Tachi) Jugo Beltrán for her invaluable comments and suggestions.

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  1. FFyH, UNC, Córdoba, Argentina

    Mario Andrés Chalita

  2. Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia, United States

    Alexander Sedzielarz

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  1. Mario Andrés Chalita
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  2. Alexander Sedzielarz
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Correspondence to Mario Andrés Chalita.

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Chalita, M.A., Sedzielarz, A. Beyond the frame problem: what (else) can Heidegger do for AI?. AI & Soc 38, 173–184 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-021-01280-3

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