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You and I, robot

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Abstract

I address a number of issues related to building an autonomous social robot. I review different approaches to social cognition and ask how these different approaches may inform the design of social robots. I argue that regardless of which theoretical approach to social cognition one favors, instantiating that approach in a workable robot will involve designing that robot on enactive principles.

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Notes

  1. I’m involved in a large project of this sort, although my contribution is in the distant theoretical background and is focused on questions about the nature of gesture and the possibility of building gesture into the repertoire of a robot’s communicative skills. My research on robotics is supported by a grant from the Robotics Collaborative Technology Alliance and General Dynamics, #64018180, Social cues and behaviors in HR collaboration. Also, thanks to the Marie Curie Initial Training Network, Towards an Embodied Science of Intersubjectivity (TESIS). Marie Curie Actions, European Commission Research for support of my research on intersubjectivity.

  2. ST based on low-level processes associated with mirror neurons (see e.g., Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011 for a recent statement) has its own set of problems that I will not try to rehearse here (see Gallagher 2007).

  3. The phrase is from Bruner and Kalmar (1998). See Gallagher (2011b). There is more to the story than I can discuss here. The massive hermeneutical background is provided not only by our bodily interactive skills, but also by the wealth of narratives that we have at our disposal (see Gallagher and Hutto 2008; Hutto 2008).

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Correspondence to Shaun Gallagher.

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Gallagher, S. You and I, robot. AI & Soc 28, 455–460 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-012-0420-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-012-0420-4

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