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Journal of Cryptology

, Volume 30, Issue 3, pp 699–734 | Cite as

Merkle’s Key Agreement Protocol is Optimal: An \(O(n^2)\) Attack on Any Key Agreement from Random Oracles

  • Boaz BarakEmail author
  • Mohammad Mahmoody
Article

Abstract

We prove that every key agreement protocol in the random oracle model in which the honest users make at most n queries to the oracle can be broken by an adversary who makes \(O(n^2)\) queries to the oracle. This improves on the previous \({\tilde{\Omega }}(n^6)\) query attack given by Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC ’89) and resolves an open question posed by them. Our bound is optimal up to a constant factor since Merkle proposed a key agreement protocol in 1974 that can be easily implemented with n queries to a random oracle and cannot be broken by any adversary who asks \(o(n^2)\) queries.

Keywords

Key agreement Random oracle Merkle puzzles 

Notes

Acknowledgments

We thank Russell Impagliazzo for very useful discussions and the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Harvard John A. Paulson School of Engineering and Applied SciencesHarvard UniversityCambridgeUSA
  2. 2.University of VirginiaCharlottesvilleUSA

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