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A Proof of Security of Yao’s Protocol for Two-Party Computation

Abstract

In the mid 1980s, Yao presented a constant-round protocol for securely computing any two-party functionality in the presence of semi-honest adversaries (FOCS 1986). In this paper, we provide a complete description of Yao’s protocol, along with a rigorous proof of security. Despite the importance of Yao’s protocol to the theory of cryptography and in particular to the field of secure computation, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that an explicit proof of security has been published.

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Correspondence to Yehuda Lindell.

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Most of this work was carried out while at IBM T.J. Watson Research, New York.

Most of this work was carried out while at HP Labs, New Jersey.

Communicated by Dan Boneh.

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Lindell, Y., Pinkas, B. A Proof of Security of Yao’s Protocol for Two-Party Computation. J Cryptol 22, 161–188 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00145-008-9036-8

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Keywords

  • Secure two-party computation
  • Semi-honest adversaries
  • Yao’s two-party protocol
  • Proofs of security