What Use Is Science to Animal Welfare?

Abstract

My concern is to question the quality and utility of science in general and ethology in particular as applied to animal welfare. This topic has in the past provoked me to some severe criticism, for example, 'A lot of well-intended welfare research is neither very good science nor very helpful to the animals.... Too much welfare research is (in my opinion) flawed either because it is oversimplistic, or because it is not so much designed to test preconceptions but to reinforce prejudice' (Webster 1994). Dawkins (1997) has recently responded to this challenge, addressing the question 'Why has there not been more progress in welfare research?' Her response is concerned largely with applied ethology. My own criticism was not directed at ethologists in particular. I was more concerned by the misuse of scientific method by those who seek to obtain a so-called 'objective' measurement of something which they preconceive to be a stress (e.g. measurement of plasma concentrations of cortisol or endorphins in animals following transportation). Here the 'objective' measure frequently becomes the test that gives the answer that they want, and if it fails, then they seek other 'objective' markers until they achieve a set of measurements that supports the subjective impression which they had at the outset.

My second main concern is that the welfare state of a sentient animal is a very complex affair and cannot be embraced by any single scientific discipline, be it ethology, physiology, molecular or neurobiology. Unfortunately it is also too complex to be embraced by a single-sentence definition. The best I can do is to suggest that it is determined by the capacity of an animal to sustain physical fitness and avoid mental suffering. The assessment of this is necessarily multidisciplinary.