Abstract
We demonstrate the important consequence of one particular type of voter behavior: the “differentiation” (“no-quibbling”) constraint that alternatives too similar to the alternative which they might replace will not be considered. We find that imposition of a sufficient differentiation norm leads to stable outcomes of decision making in a spatial context. We also briefly consider the potential effects of other possible constraints on feasible choices, especially as these might synergistically interact with choices based on “no-quibbling.”
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Feld, S.L., Grofman, B. Stability induced by “no-quibbling”. Group Decis Negot 5, 283–294 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00020690
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00020690