Abstract.
The nature of the equilibria arising under spatial differentiation is investigated here in a duopoly model, where at least one firm maximises value added per worker. The study shows that if firms' objectives differ, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, which is possibly characterised by asymmetric locations. If both firms are labour-managed, there exists a (symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies with firms located at the first and third quartiles, if and only if the setup cost is low enough. Otherwise, undercutting is profitable.
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Received: 16 March 2000 / Accepted: 15 March 2001
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Lambertini, L. Spatial competition with profit-maximising and labour-managed firms. Papers Reg Sci 80, 499–507 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00013647
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00013647