Summary.
A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional B ayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable.
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Received: January 12, 1998; revised version: March 30, 2000
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Hahn, G., Yannelis, N. Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies. Econ Theory 18, 485–509 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004196
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004196