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Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete

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Summary.

The paper analyzes the properties of cores with differential information, as economies converge to complete information. Two core concepts are investigated: the private core, in which agents' net trades are measurable with respect to agents' private information, and the incentive compatible core, in which coalitions of agents are restricted to incentive compatible allocations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Illinois, 1206 South Sixth Street, Champaign, IL 61820, USA (e-mail: skrasa@uiuc.edu) , , , , , , US

    Stefan Krasa & Wayne Shafer

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  1. Stefan Krasa
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  2. Wayne Shafer
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Received: March 15, 2000; revised version: August 24, 2000

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Krasa, S., Shafer, W. Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete. Econ Theory 18, 451–471 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004194

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00004194

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