Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The Incentive Effects of Appointment Tournaments in German Higher Education

  • Appointment System
  • Published:
Schmalenbach Business Review Aims and scope

Abstract

In 2001, the German system of higher education underwent reforms that were, among others, intended to raise the incentives for university professors. However, even before the reform, publication records of university German professors showed high output levels over a long period of academic careers. We present one possibility of rationalizing the observed behavior by modeling the incentive effects of appointment tournaments in German higher education. We extend Lazear and Rosen (1981) by allowing for intrinsic motivation applying J-curved effort cost functions and accounting for contestant heterogeneity distinguishing junior academics and professors. We analyze the effects of selected reform elements on the incentives arising from the appointment system.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Backes-Gellner, Uschi and Kerstin Pull (2008), Travel Incentives as Tournament Compensation — Problems of Contestant Heterogeneity and Solutions, Best Paper Conference Proceedings of the Academy of Management Anaheim.

    Google Scholar 

  • Backes-Gellner, Uschi and Axel Schlinghoff (2004), Careers, Incentives and Publication Patterns of US and German (Business) Economists, Working Paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Gary S. (1993), A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education, 3rd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Borchert, Manfred and Herbert Gülicher (2000), Zwei bis drei Bewerber auf eine Professorenstelle, Forschung & Lehre 7, 345–346.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buch, Florian and Gero Federkeil (2007), Fünf Jahre Juniorprofessur — Zweite CHE-Befragung zum Stand der Einführung.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung BMBF (2000), Hochschuldienstrecht für das 21. Jahrhundert — Das Konzept des BMBF — vom 21.09.2000.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bulmahn, Edelgard (2001), Leistungsorientierte Entlohnung — kann die geplante Dienstrechtsreform die Abwanderung von qualifizierten Nachwuchswissenschaftlern verhindern?, ifo-Schnelldienst 54, 5–7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chlosta, Kristin, Kerstin Pull, Marina Fiedler, and Isabell Welpe (2010), Should I stay or should I go? Warum Nachwuchswissenschaftler in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre das Universitätssystem verlassen, Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, forthcoming.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coupé, Tom, Valérie Smeets, and Frédéric Warzynski (2003), Incentives in Economic Departments: Testing Tournaments, Aarhus School of Business Economics Working Paper No. 03–25.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coupé, Tom, Valérie Smeets, and Frédéric Warzynski (2005), Incentives, Sorting and Productivity along the Career: Evidence from a Sample of Top Economists, The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization 22, 137–167.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Delfgaauw, Josse and Robert Dur (2003), Signaling and Screening of Workers’ Motivation, CESifo Working Paper No. 1099.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fabel, Oliver, Erik Lehmann, and Susanne Warning (2002), Der relative Vorteil deutscher wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Fachbereiche im Wettbewerb um studentischen Zuspruch: Qualität des Studiengangs oder des Studienortes?, zfbf 54, 509–526.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fiedler, Marina and Isabell Welpe (2008), Appointment Preferences of Management Professors, sbr 60, 4–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fiedler, Marina, Isabell Welpe, and Arnold Picot (2006), Terra Incognita — Forschungsleistungen und Qualifizierungswege des deutschsprachigen Hochschullehrernachwuchses für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Die Betriebswirtschaft 4, 464–486.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck, Egon and Christian Opitz (2000), Anreizsysteme für Professoren in den USA und in Deutschland, Zeitschrift Führung und Organisation 69, 234–240.

    Google Scholar 

  • Franck, Egon P. and Bruno Schönfelder (2000), On the Role of Competition in Higher Education — Uses and Abuses of the Economic Metaphor, sbr 52, 214–237.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frick, Bernd, Oliver Gürtler, and Joachim Prinz (2008), Anreize in Turnieren mit heterogenen Teilnehmern — Eine empirische Untersuchung mit Daten aus der Fußball-Bundesliga, zfbf 60, 385–405.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fünftes Gesetz zur Änderung des Hochschulrahmengesetzes und anderer Vorschriften (5. HRGÄndG), in der Fassung vom 16.02.2002, in Kraft getreten am 23.02.2002.

  • Gagné, Maryléne and Edward L. Deci (2005), Self-determination theory and work motivation, Journal of Organizational Behavior 26, 331–362.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gesetz zur Reform der Professorenbesoldung (ProfBesReformG), in der Fassung vom 16.02.2002, in Kraft getreten am 23.02.2002.

  • Harbring, Christine, Bernd Irlenbusch, and Matthias Kräkel (2004), Ökonomische Analyse der Professorenbesoldungsreform in Deutschland, in Wolfgang Franz, Hans-Jürgen Ramser, and Manfred Stadler (eds.), Bildung. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar Ottobeuren 33, Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jost, Peter-J. and Matthias Kräkel (2006), Simultaneous- versus Sequential-Move Tournaments with Heterogeneous Agents, sbr 58, 306–331.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kossbiel, Hugo (2004), Die Abbildung von Arbeitsleid und Arbeitsfreude in Nutzenfunktionen — Erkenntnisse aus einem Experiment, in Robert M. Gillenkirch, Bernd Schauenberg, Heike Y. Schenk-Mathes, and Louis John Velthuis (eds.), Wertorientierte Unternehmenssteuerung. Festschrift für Helmut Laux, Berlin: Springer, 99–131.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kräkel, Matthias (2005), Emotions and the Optimality of Unfair Tournaments, GESY Discussion Paper No. 45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kräkel, Matthias (2006), Zur Reform der Professorenbesoldung in Deutschland, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 7, 105–126.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kräkel, Matthias and Dirk Sliwka (2004), Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments, German Economic Review 5, 69–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lach, Saul and Mark Schankerman (2008), Incentives and invention in universities, RAND Journal of Economics 39, 403–433.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, Edward P. and Sherwin Rosen (1981), Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts, Journal of Political Economy 89, 841–864.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lacy, Fiona J. and Barry A. Sheehan (1997), Job satisfaction among academic staff: An international perspective, Higher Education 34, 305–322.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McLaughlin, Kenneth (1988), Aspects of Tournament Models: A Survey, Research in Labor Economics, 9, 225–256.

    Google Scholar 

  • Neunzig, Alexander R. (2002), Effiziente Fixlöhne, Arbeitsfreude und Überwachungskosten, The CSLE Discussion Paper Series DP 2002–02.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth (1999), Wissenschaft in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung, Forschung & Lehre 5, 228–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pema, Elda (2002), Internal Labor Markets Revisited: Tournaments in Academia, Michigan State University Working Paper.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rauber, Michael and Heinrich W. Ursprung (2006), Evaluation of Researchers: A Life Cycle Analysis of German Academic Economists, CESifo Working Paper No. 1673.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schlinghoff, Axel and Uschi Backes-Gellner (2002), Publikationsindikatoren und die Stabilität wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Zeitschriftenrankings, zfbf 54, 343–362.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schlinghoff, Axel (2003), Karriereanreize für deutsche und US-amerikanische Hochschullehrer — eine personalökonomische und empirische Analyse des langfristigen Forschungsoutputs, dissertation, University of Cologne.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stadler, Manfred (2003), Leistungsorientierte Besoldung von Hochschullehrern auf der Grundlage objektiv messbarer Kriterien?, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Studium 32, 334–339.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wenig, Alois (2000), Die Besoldung von Professoren, List Forum für Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik 26, 1–15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wolf, Joachim, Anne Rohn, and Klaus Macharzina (2006), Forschungsleistung in der deutschsprachigen Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag/GWV Fachverlage GmbH.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Human Resource Management and Organization, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Nauklerstraße 47, D-72074, Tübingen, Germany

    Kristin Chlosta (Research Assistant)

  2. Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Nauklerstraße 47, D-72074, Tübingen, Germany

    Kerstin Pull (Chair of Human Resource Management and Organization)

Authors
  1. Kristin Chlosta
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Kerstin Pull
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Kristin Chlosta.

Additional information

We would like to thank two anonymous referees and the editor for their valuable comments.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Chlosta, K., Pull, K. The Incentive Effects of Appointment Tournaments in German Higher Education. Schmalenbach Bus Rev 62, 378–400 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03396812

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03396812

JEL-Classification

Keywords

Search

Navigation