Operationism, Mechanism, and Psychological Reality: The Second-Coming of Linguistic Relativity

Abstract

The nature of scientific explanation is examined from the convergent viewpoints of Skinner’s behavior-analytic theory and Whorf’s theory of linguistic relativity. In contrast to classical modes of scientific explanation, both Skinner and Whorf regard scientific activity as a social product, generated and maintained by verbal communities that determine what does and does not constitute legitimate explanation. It is suggested from Whorf’s comparative analyses of Western and non-Western languages that what different cultures accept as legitimate explanation depends on how their respective linguistic systems dissect natural phenomena. English and related languages, organized around nouns and implicit agent-action locutions, favor mechanistic explanation couched in terms of “cause-effect” relations. Other languages carve nature up differently, and thus accept quite different, yet equally valid, forms of explanation. It is suggested that some of the misconceptions surrounding Skinner’s position may arise from the fundamental incongruence between the linguistic patterns of English and the conceptual fabric of modern behavior-analytic theory.