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Do Willful Apes Know What They Are Aiming At?

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Abstract

The volitional nature of action as it may be inferred in the intentional acts of chimpanzees is explored through the medium of a theory of intention developed from cognitive psychology and the theory of action within philosophy. A sketch of a theory of intention from these sources is formulated. The behavioral basis for inferring intentional action is briefly explored to provide behavioral criteria applicable to chimpanzees and other nonhumans. Four episodes are then examined for the plausible use of these criteria for inferring intentions from the behavior of several chimpanzees. This examination suggests that the concept of intention based on human action theory appears applicable to the behavior of chimpanzees in complex problem-solving situations. In these situations, flexible planning of behavior is necessary for successful solution of problems and includes communication both between chimpanzees and with humans. Several approaches to future research are suggested.

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This study was supported by grants from the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development (HD-06016) and from the Division of Research Resources, National Institutes of Health (RR-00165) to the Yerkes Regional Primate Center.

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Putney, R.T. Do Willful Apes Know What They Are Aiming At?. Psychol Rec 35, 49–62 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03394908

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03394908

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