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Status and Behavior in the Reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

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Abstract

Thirty male undergraduate subjects played 100 trials of a standard prisoner’s dilemma game under one of three experimental conditions (N = 10 in each): in Condition 1 the Other Player was portrayed as being of higher status than the subjects; in Condition 2, of equal status with the subjects; and in Condition 3, of lower status than the subjects. In reality, in all three conditions, the Other Player was simulated by a probability randomizer previously programmed to play a predetermined strategy. The results indicated that subjects playing with equal-status Others (Condition 2) were significantly more competitive than subjects playing with either higher- or lower-status Others (Conditions 1 and 3). The findings are interpreted in accord with earlier research on individual differences in game behavior.

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Mack, D. Status and Behavior in the Reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Psychol Rec 26, 529–532 (1976). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03394420

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03394420

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