The Behavior Analyst

, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp 33–49 | Cite as

Radical Behaviorism and the Subjective-Objective Distinction

  • Jay Moore
Article

Abstract

The distinction between subjective and objective domains is central to traditional psychology, including the various forms of mediational stimulus-organism-response neobehaviorism that treat the elements of a subjective domain as hypothetical constructs. Radical behaviorism has its own unique perspective on the subjective-objective distinction. For radical behaviorism, dichotomies between subjective and objective, knower and known, or observer and agent imply at most unique access to a part of the world, rather than dichotomous ontologies. This perspective leads to unique treatments of such important philosophical matters as (a) dispositions and (b) the difference between first- and third-person psychological sentences.

Key words

radical behaviorism subjective objective dispositions first- and third-person sentences private events 

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Copyright information

© Association for Behavior Analysis International 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jay Moore
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of Wisconsin-MilwaukeeMilwaukeeUSA

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