Abstract
Viewing the science of behavior (behavior analysis) to be a natural science, radical behaviorism rejects any form of dualism, including subjective–objective or inner–outer dualism. Yet radical behaviorists often claim that treating private events as covert behavior and internal stimuli is necessary and important to behavior analysis. To the contrary, this paper argues that, compared with the rejection of dualism, private events constitute a trivial idea and are irrelevant to accounts of behavior. Viewed in the framework of evolutionary theory or for any practical purpose, behavior is commerce with the environment. By its very nature, behavior is extended in time. The temptation to posit private events arises when an activity is viewed in too small a time frame, obscuring what the activity does. When activities are viewed in an appropriately extended time frame, private events become irrelevant to the account. This insight provides the answer to many philosophical questions about thinking, sensing, and feeling. Confusion about private events arises in large part from failure to appreciate fully the radical implications of replacing mentalistic ideas about language with the concept of verbal behavior. Like other operant behavior, verbal behavior involves no agent and no hidden causes; like all natural events, it is caused by other natural events. In a science of behavior grounded in evolutionary theory, the same set of principles applies to verbal and nonverbal behavior and to human and nonhuman organisms.
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Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the annual meetings of the Association for Behavior Analysis, May 1995, and the American Psychological Association, August 1995. I thank Howard Rachlin for thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of the paper.
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Baum, W.M. Behaviorism, private events, and the molar view of behavior. BEHAV ANALYST 34, 185–200 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392249
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392249