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A reply to Leigland’s “is a new version of philosophical pragmatism necessary? A reply to Barnes-Holmes”

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Barnes-Holmes, D. A reply to Leigland’s “is a new version of philosophical pragmatism necessary? A reply to Barnes-Holmes”. BEHAV ANALYST 27, 113–116 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03392097

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