Hypothetical high-level cognitive functions cannot be localized in the brain: Another argument for a revitalized behaviorism

Abstract

A key epistemological difference between behaviorism and cognitivism concerns their respective attitudes toward the analysis of so-called cognitive processes into functional modules. Behaviorists generally say it is not possible. Cognitivists argue that this is an achievable goal. The question has been concretized by recent developments in brain imaging technology. A consideration of the matter suggests that technical and conceptual difficulties abound in the effort to localize “high-level cognitive functions” in narrowly circumscribed regions of the brain. Some of the most serious involve the ambiguous definition of the putative mental components that are to be localized and the generally unacknowledged nonlinear complexity of both psychological processes and the brain. In addition, the imaging techniques themselves are replete with technical difficulties that raise additional questions about this particular application, even though these wonderful machines can make extraordinary contributions to our knowledge of brain anatomy and physiology. The cumulative implication of these difficulties is that the cognitive approach to the study of scientific psychology has once again set out on a search for a chimera. New approaches to behaviorism may be required to set psychology back on the correct track.