In today’s paradigmatic climate, the possibility of knowledge, and therefore science, still depends upon our being conscious. However, no scientifically accepted account of consciousness exists. In recent years I have developed the theory of brain-sign which replaces consciousness as a wholly physical neural condition. The first tenet is that the brain is a causal organ, not a knowledge organ. The second is that brain-sign, used in inter-neural communication for uncertain or imprecise collective action, derives at each moment from the causal orientation of the brain. Signs are ubiquitous bio-physical entities. Thus there is no problematic dualism, consciousness and world. We now have two accounts of the brain phenomenon. The first (consciousness) is an inexplicable physical anomaly. The second (brain-sign) belongs in the physical universe, and fulfils a crucial neurobiological function. With brain-sign theory we even ‘discover’ that we do not know we are alive or will die.
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Clapson, P. Knowledge, Science and Death: The Theory of Brain-Sign. Act Nerv Super 56, 105–120 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03379615