Bad Banks — Good Bank Resolution?

Zusammenfassung

Der Beitrag beschreibt privatwirtschaftliche und staatHche Erscheinungsformen von Bad Banks und ordnet diese in das Spektrum der bankenrettungsinstrumente ein. Nach einer Diskussion der mit Bad Banks verfolgten Zielsetzungen werden die in der Praxis beobachteten bad bank Varianten verglichen. Der Fokus liegt dabei auf den im Zuge der Finanzmarktkrise in Deutschland und uSA umgesetzten bad bank Lösungen. Mit Hilfe eines einfachen Modells wird untersucht, welchen beitrag bad banks zur Lösung der als «Moral Hazard» bekannten Tendenz zur Übernahme exzessiver Risiken durch insolvenzgefährdete banken leisten.

Abstract

The paper explains different forms of appearances of bad banks and their role in the context of bank rescue instruments. After discussing objectives of bad banks the paper compares the bad bank variants that were implemented during the concurrent financial crisis in the US and Germany. A simple model is used to analyze the ability of bad banks to limit moral hazard behavior of distressed banks, i.e. tendency of banks to invest into excessively risky projects.

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Correspondence to Mark Wahrenburg.

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Ich danke Andreas Pfingsten, Thomas von Lüpke, Christian Bluhm und einem anonymen Gutachter für viele wertvolle Hinweise.

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Wahrenburg, M. Bad Banks — Good Bank Resolution?. Schmalenbachs Z betriebswirtsch Forsch 65, 42–71 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03373022

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JEL Classification

  • G21
  • G23
  • G28
  • G32

Keywords

  • Bad bank
  • Bank resolution
  • Bail out
  • Banking Crisis
  • Moral Hazard in banking
  • Bankenrettung
  • Bankenkrise
  • Moral Hazard