Zusammenfassung
Der Artikel behandelt den Fall Hypo Real Estate Holding (HRE) während der Finanzkrise von 2007 und leitet hieraus Implikationen für zukünftige Bankenregulierung ab. Die Finanzkrise verursachte bei der HRE direkt eine Liquiditäts- sowie indirekt eine Solvabilitätskrise. Aufgrund der systemischen Bedeutung der HRE war die Stabilisierung mit Hilfe der Regierung unerlässlich. Die Entwicklung eines tragfähigen Geschäftsmodells im Anschluss an die Rettung beinhaltete die strategische Neuausrichtung der Kernbank und die Reduktion nichtstrategischer Portfolien. Die Fallstudie unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit institutioneller Rahmenbedingungen und geeigneter Instrumente zum Umgang mit in Schieflage geratenen systemisch relevanten Banken.
Abstract
This article examines the case of Hypo Real Estate Holding (HRE) during the financial crisis of 2007 and the implications that can be derived for future regulation of banks. The financial crisis triggered directly a liquidity crisis as well as indirectly a solvency crisis at HRE. Given HRE Group’s systemic relevance, the stabilization of HRE with support from the government was a necessity. Following the government bailout, a viable business model with a strategy for a realigned core bank had to be defined and non-strategic portfolios had to be managed down. The case of HRE highlights the necessity to create the institutional conditions and an appropriate set of tools to deal with banks of systemic relevance during crises, both at a national and at an international level.
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Additional information
Prof. Dr. Axel Wieandt, CEO of Hypo Real Estate Holding AG from October 13, 2008 to March 25, 2010 and Honorary Professor, Endowed Chair of Finance, WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management. Sebastian C. Moenninghoff, Executive Assistant to Dr. Axel Wieandt from September 1, 2009 to March 25, 2010 and Research Assistant, Endowed Chair of Finance, WHU ?Otto Beisheim School of Management, Burgplatz 2, 56179 Vallendar, Germany.
The article expresses the personal views of the authors. The authors thank the anonymous referees for their valuable comments and recommendations.
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Wieandt, A., Moenninghoff, S.C. The Financial Crisis: Observations and Implications. Schmalenbachs Z betriebswirtsch Forsch 63, 508–530 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03372851
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03372851