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„Never Change a Winning Team“ — Team-Entlohnung und implizite Kooperation

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Summary

The optimal incentives for a team are analyzed in a principal-agent model. It is shown that it can be beneficial to make an agent’s compensation positively dependent on another agent’s success even when tasks are technologically independent. The introduction of team compensation induces implicit cooperation and mutual monitoring. This is modeled explicitly in a repeated game. Team compensation can be optimal even in cases, where in the static model relative performance evaluation is preferred. It is the more beneficial the higher the probability of an ongoing relationship.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Betriebswirtschaftliche Abteilung II, Universität Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113, Bonn, Deutschland

    Dirk Sliwka

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  1. Dirk Sliwka
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Correspondence to Dirk Sliwka.

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Der Autor dankt Matthias Kräkel, Urs Schweizer und Joachim Wessels für sehr hilfreiche Hinweise und Kommentare.

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Sliwka, D. „Never Change a Winning Team“ — Team-Entlohnung und implizite Kooperation. Schmalenbachs Z betriebswirtsch Forsch 53, 777–797 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03372668

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