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Wandelanleihen als Leistungsanreizmechanismus

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Zusammenfassung

Während Wandelanleihen sich mittlerweile als eigene Assetklasse am kontinentaleuropäischen Kapitalmarkt etabliert haben, konnte die Frage nach den Einsatzmotiven für dieses Finanzinstrument noch nicht abschließend geklärt werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag greift diese Fragestellung auf und beschäftigt sich mit der Emission von Wandelanleihen zur Lösung des Leistungsanreizproblems in Unternehmen. Auf Basis von Reputationsüberlegungen wird ein agencytheoretisches Modell entwickelt, welches im Ergebnis zeigt, dass Wandelanleihen nicht nur ein Mittel zur Kapitalbeschaffung, sondern gleichzeitig ein effektives Managementanreizsystem darstellen, das alternativ oder ergänzend zu herkömmlichen Anreizmechanismen eingesetzt werden kann.

Summary

Based on time-series regressions, this paper analyses whether multifactor models according to Fama/French (1993) can capture the time variation in returns and if they can explain the cross-section of average returns in the German stock market. It is shown that similar to studies for the US, Canadian, and UK stock market, a three-factor model that includes stock market factors related to firm size and book-to-market equity, besides the overall stock market factor, has a higher explanatory power than the one-factor model based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model. In contrast, two bond market factors (related to the term spread and default risks) in a five-factor model have no additional explanatory power. Indeed, the three-factor model can capture the time variation in stock returns for Germany to a less extent than for the US and UK. In contrast, the cross-section of average returns are better explained in the German stock market compared to the US stock market.

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Für die wertvollen Hinweise und Anmerkungen danke ich dem (der) anonymen Gutachter(in).

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Schulz, M. Wandelanleihen als Leistungsanreizmechanismus. Schmalenbachs Z betriebswirtsch Forsch 59, 333–354 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03371700

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