Abstract
This article assesses the effects of banking on tradable emission permit markets and, in particular, the role of uncertainty in permit markets that allow banking. In such markets, current and future spot trade markets are linked: An increase in uncertainty about future spot markets at first lowers spot prices due to the presence of unregulated agents but soon spurs an increase in spot prices.
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Maeda, A. Impact of banking and forward contracts on tradable permit markets. Environ Econ Policy Stud 6, 81–102 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03353932
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03353932