Abstract
Firms use the strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) against citizens who complain about poor compliance with environmental rules and regulations. As a consequence, lawmakers have proposed banning SLAPPs in public debate. Theory suggests, however, that a SLAPP ban might be inefficient because it eliminates the efficient signaling equilibrium. This study extends the conflict model to include reputation effects. Our results suggest that a SLAPP ban can increase efficiency but only under a restrictive set of assumptions. One such assumption is that a ban makes sense when firms do not use the SLAPP to build a reputation, which contradicts the spirit of why firms use it in the first place. A SLAPP ban might increase efficiency, however, if it reduces the efficiency losses of chills during the interim periods when a firm builds its reputation.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Baik KH, Shogren JF (1992) Strategic behavior in contests: comment. American Economic Review 82:359–362
Baik KH, Shogren JF (1994) Environmental conflicts with reimbursement for citizen suits. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 27:1–20
Cho IK, Kreps DM (1987) Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102:179–221
Dixit A (1987) Strategic behavior in contests. American Economic Review 77:891–898
Fudenberg D, Tirole J (1992) Game theory. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA
Hurley TM, Shogren JF (1997) Environmental conflicts and the SLAPP. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 33:253–273
Hurley TM, Shogren JF (1998) Asymmetric information contests. European Journal of Political Economy 14:645–665
Naysnerski W, Tietenberg T (1992) Private enforcement of federal environmental law. Land Economics 68:28–48
Pring GW, Canan P (1995) SLAPPs: getting sued for speaking out. Temple University Press, Philadelphia
Samuelson L (1987) A note on uncertainty and cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma. International Journal of Game Theory 16:187–195
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
About this article
Cite this article
Settle, C., Shogren, J.F. Environmental conflicts with SLAPP reputations. Environ Econ Policy Stud 4, 129–139 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03353920
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03353920