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Versicherungsbetrug aus vertragstheoretischer Sicht

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Zusammenfassung

Versicherungsmissbrauch ist ein volkswirtschaftlich relevantes Problem. Mit der Deregulierung des Versicherungsmarktes in Deutschland nach 1994 sind wesentliche Beschränkungen der Vertragsgestaltung aufgehoben worden. Damit ergibt sich die Notwendigkeit, dieses Instrument einer kritischen Untersuchung zuzuführen, um das Potential zur Verringerung von Versicherungsbetrug aufzuarbeiten. Dies hat die vorliegende Arbeit zum Inhalt. Drei Formen des Versicherungsbetrugs, „Costly State Verification“, „Costly State Falsification“ und Betrug durch eine dritte Partei, werden analysiert. Weiterhin werden Konsequenzen für die optimale Vertragsgestaltung hergeleitet.

Abstract

Insurance fraud is a significant economic problem. Following the deregulation of the German insurance market in 1994, contractual features are now possible which were previously restricted. Therefore, there is a need to analyse the insurance fraud reduction potential of this instrument. This paper investigates three forms of insurance fraud: „Costly State Verification“, „ Costly State Falsification“ and third party fraud. Consequences for the optimal contractual design are deduced.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lehrstuhl für Wirtschaftstheorie, Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Nürnberg

    Andreas Knaus & Achim Wambach

Authors
  1. Andreas Knaus
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  2. Achim Wambach
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Correspondence to Andreas Knaus.

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Wir bedanken uns bei der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft für die finanzielle Unterstützung im Rahmen des Projekts WA 1433 1-1.

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Knaus, A., Wambach, A. Versicherungsbetrug aus vertragstheoretischer Sicht. Zeitschr. f. d. ges. Versicherungsw. 92, 9–34 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03190787

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