Skip to main content
Log in

Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo

  • Articles
  • Published:
Public Choice Aims and scope Submit manuscript

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

References

  • Black, D.The Theory of Committees and Elections. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bowen, H.R. ‘The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic Resources.’Quarterly Journal of Economics (November), 1943.

  • Breton, A., and R. Wintrobe. ‘The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-Maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen’s Theory of Bureaucracy.’Journal of Political Economy (February), 1975.

  • Edwards, F.R. ‘Managerial Objectives in Regulated Industries: Expense-Preference Behavior in Banking.’Journal of Political Economy (February), 1977.

  • Holcombe, R.G.A Public Choice Analysis of Millage Issue Elections for Financing Public Schools. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (1975).

  • Inman, R.P. ‘Testing Political Economy’s “As If” Proposition: Is the Median Voter Really Decisive?’.Public Choice (Summer), 1978.

  • Margolis, J. ‘Comment [on Niskanen].’Journal of Law and Economics (December), 1975.

  • Niskanen, W.Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago, Aldine-Atherton, 1971.

    Google Scholar 

  • Niskanen, W. ‘Bureaucrats and Politicians.’Journal of Law and Economics (December), 1975.

  • Riker, W., and P. Ordeshook.An Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1973.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Financial support was provided, in part, by The Spencer Foundation. We thank M. Harris, J. Lave, S. Salop, and participants in workshops at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and at Queen’s University for helpful comments.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Romer, T., Rosenthal, H. Political resource allocation, controlled agendas, and the status quo. Public Choice 33, 27–43 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03187594

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03187594

Keywords

Navigation