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With the main exception of W. Friedmann,Legal Theory, London, Stevens, 1967.
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Adolf Reinach,Zur Phänomenologie des Rechts, München, Kösel-Verlag, 1953, originally published asDie apriorischen Grundlagen des bürgerlichen Rechts, 1913; Gerhart Husserl,Recht und Welt: Rechtsphilosophische Abhandlungen, Frankfurt, V. Klostermann, 1964, and seePhänomenologie, Rechtsphilosophie, Jurisprudenz: Festchrift für Gerhart Husserl, Frankfurt, V. Klostermann, 1969.
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In contrast to many writers within the American Realist School who characteristically offer compact definitions of law see e.g. the three examples offered by H. L. A. Hart,The Concept of Law, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1961, 1.
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Supra note 8..
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Supra note 52 “, in Natanson,supra note 5 in at 444.
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Ibid. “, Natanson,supra note 5 in, at 388.
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Supra note 16.
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Supra note 24 at 144.
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Ibid..
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Supra note 8 ; at 145.
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Supra note 58 “, at 4.
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Ibid. The Pure Theory of Law (translated M. Knight), Berkeley & Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1967. at 193–221.
Supra note 24 see hisThe Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970 at 104.
Ibid. Supra note 24 see hisThe Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970 at 141.
Ibid. Supra note 24 see hisThe Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970 at 141; and see Husserl’s critique of Kant’s logic inLogical Investigations, supra note 44 London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, at Vol. 1, 76.
Ibid., Logical Investigations, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970, Vol. 1, 88.
An Introduction to the Sociology of Law, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1939, ch. 1.
The Division of Labour in Society, translated by G. Simpson, New York, Macmillan and Co., 1933, book one.
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London, Heinemann, 1972.
Laurie Spurling,Phenomenology and the Social World, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, 175.
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This article was originally presented as a paper at a conference in April 1981 on Critical Legal Studies, organised by the Law Faculty of the University of Kent.
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Schiff, D. Phenomenology and jurisprudence. Liverpool Law Rev 4, 5–18 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03185304
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03185304