The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions
Legislators possess political assets that economic interest groups may find valuable in pursuing their goals. This paper examines the effect these legislative assets have on the campaign contributions made by two large and easily identifiable interest groups: corporations and labor unions. Committee assignment, voting record, and electoral security are significant predictors of both corporate and union contributions to House incumbents, while party affiliation and years in office also influence the behavior of union political action committees.
KeywordsInterest Group Public Choice Election Cycle Campaign Contribution Party Affiliation
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