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Journal of Labor Research

, Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 349–361 | Cite as

The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions

  • Kevin B. Grier
  • Michael C. Munger
Articles

Abstract

Legislators possess political assets that economic interest groups may find valuable in pursuing their goals. This paper examines the effect these legislative assets have on the campaign contributions made by two large and easily identifiable interest groups: corporations and labor unions. Committee assignment, voting record, and electoral security are significant predictors of both corporate and union contributions to House incumbents, while party affiliation and years in office also influence the behavior of union political action committees.

Keywords

Interest Group Public Choice Election Cycle Campaign Contribution Party Affiliation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer 1986

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kevin B. Grier
    • 1
  • Michael C. Munger
    • 2
  1. 1.George Mason UniversityFairfax
  2. 2.University of TexasAustin

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