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Withdrawal legitimised? On the proposal by the constitutional Convention for the right of secession from the EU

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  • Issues Relating to the Constitution for an Enlarged European Union
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Intereconomics

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Summary

All in all it can be stated that since the heterogeneity of the EU will increase considerably due to its enlargement and at the same time the trend towards centralisation and redistribution will be strengthened, secession and opting out will become important as constitutional arrangements for the EU. They are an instrument against stronger centralisation and redistribution mechnanisms. They make a contribution to the operationality of the subsidiarity principle. They form a counterweight to the domination of minorities by majority decisions. At the same time they facilitate the mechanisms for the endogenous determination of the optimal size of the EU and for the increasing of the efficiency of the EU institutions in the sense of federalism theory. Globalisation increasingly requires and enforces liberal institutions of integration. Every country should therefore have the choice of terminating its participation in a Community policy or even its membership of a club in a regulated fashion. Thus, the European Convention has made a trail-blazing proposal with the constitutional right of secession from the EU.

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Schäfer, W. Withdrawal legitimised? On the proposal by the constitutional Convention for the right of secession from the EU. Intereconomics 38, 182–185 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03031704

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